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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have
led to the creation of realistic-looking digital images that pose a
major challenge to their detection by humans or computers. GANs
are used in a wide range of tasks, from modifying small attributes
of an image (StarGAN [14]), transferring attributes between image
pairs (CycleGAN [91]), as well as generating entirely new images
(ProGAN [36], StyleGAN [37], SPADE/GauGAN [64]). In this paper,
we propose a novel approach to detect, attribute and localize GAN
generated images that combines image features with deep learning
methods. For every image, co-occurrence matrices are computed
on neighborhood pixels of RGB channels in different directions
(horizontal, vertical and diagonal). A deep learning network is then
trained on these features to detect, attribute and localize these GAN
generated/manipulated images. A large scale evaluation of our
approach on 5 GAN datasets comprising over 2.76 million images
(ProGAN, StarGAN, CycleGAN, StyleGAN and SPADE/GauGAN)
shows promising results in detecting GAN generated images.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The advent of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [42, 71] has
shown application in a wide variety of image processing tasks,
and image manipulation is no exception. In particular, Genera-
tive Adversarial Networks (GANs) [24] have been one of the most
promising advancements in image enhancement and manipulation
- the generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) patents grew by 500%
in 2019 [2]. Due to the success of using GANs for image editing,
it is now possible to use a combination of GANs and off-the-shelf
image-editing tools to modify digital images to such an extent that
it has become difficult to distinguish doctored images from nor-
mal ones. In December 2019, Facebook announced that it removed
Figure 1: Input test set images on the top row, and our pro-
posed detection heatmaps on the bottom. The two images
on the left are authentic zebra images, those on the right
are generated using CycleGAN.
hundreds of accounts whose profile pictures were generated using
AI [1, 3].
The GAN training procedure involves a generator and discrim-
inator. The generator may take in an input image and a desired
attribute to change, then output an image containing that attribute.
The discriminator will then try to differentiate between images pro-
duced by the generator and the authentic training examples. The
generator and discriminator are trained in an alternate fashion, each
attempting to optimize its performance against the other. Ideally,
the generator will converge to a point where the output images are
so similar to the ground truth that a human will not be able to distin-
guish the two. In this way, GANs have been used to produce “fake”
images that are very close to the real input images. These include
image-to-image attribute transfer (CycleGAN [91]), generation of fa-
cial attributes and expressions (StarGAN [14]), as well as generation
of whole new images such as faces (ProGAN [36], StyleGAN [37]),
indoors (StyleGAN) and landscapes (SPADE/GauGAN [64]). In dig-
ital image forensics, the objective is to both detect these fake GAN
generated images, localize areas in an image which have been gen-
erated by GANs, as well as identify which type of GAN was used
in generating the fake image.
In the GAN training setup, the discriminator functions directly
as a classifier of GAN and non-GAN images. So the question could
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be raised as to why not use the GAN discriminator to detect if it’s real
or fake? To investigate this, we performed a quick test using the
CycleGAN algorithm under the maps-to-satellite-images category,
where fake maps are generated from real satellite images, and vice
versa. In our test, we observed that the discriminator accuracy over
the last 50 epochs was only 80.4%. However, state-of-the-art deep
learning detectors for CycleGAN often achieve over 99% when
tested on the same type of data which they are trained [55, 61, 88].
Though the discriminator fills its role of producing a good generator,
it does not compare performance wise to other methods which have
been suggested for detection.
While the visual results generated by GANs are promising, the
GAN based techniques alter the statistics of pixels in the images that
they generate. Hence, methods that look for deviations from natural
image statistics could be effective in detecting GAN generated fake
images. These methods have been well studied in the field of ste-
ganalysis which aims to detect the presence of hidden data in digital
images. One such method is based on analyzing co-occurrences
of pixels by computing a co-occurrence matrix. Traditionally, this
method uses hand crafted features computed on the co-occurrence
matrix and a machine learning classifier such as support vector
machines determines if a message is hidden in the image [72, 73].
Other techniques involve calculating image residuals or passing the
image through different filters before computing the co-occurrence
matrix [17, 23, 66]. Inspired by steganalysis and natural image statis-
tics, we propose a novel method to identify GAN generated images
using a combination of pixel co-occurrence matrices and deep learn-
ing. Here we pass the co-occurrence matrices directly through a
deep learning framework and allow the network to learn important
features of the co-occurrence matrices. This also makes it difficult
to perform adversarial perturbations on the co-occurrence matri-
ces since the underlying statistics will be altered. We also avoid
computation of residuals or passing an image through various fil-
ters which results in loss of information. We rather compute the
co-occurrence matrices on the image pixels itself. For detection,
we consider a two class framework - real and GAN, where a net-
work is trained on co-occurrence matrices computed on the whole
image to detect if an image is real or GAN generated. For attribu-
tion, the same network is trained in a multi-class setting depending
on which GAN the image was generated from. For localization, a
network is trained on co-occurrence matrices computed on image
patches and a heatmap was is generated to indicate which patches
are GAN generated. Detailed experimental results on large scale
GAN datasets comprising over 2.76 million images originating from
multiple diverse and challenging datasets generated using GAN
based methods show that our approach is promising and will be an
effective method for tackling future challenges of GANs.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We propose a new method for detection, attribution and
localization of GAN images using a combination of deep
learning and co-occurrence matrices.
• We compute co-occurrence matrices on different directions
of an image and then train them using deep learning. For
detection and attribution, the matrices are computed on the
whole image and for localization, the matrices are computed
on image patches to obtain a heatmap.
• We perform our tests on over 2.7 million images, which to
our knowledge, is the largest evaluation on detection of GAN
images.
• We provide explainability of our approach using t-SNE visu-
alizations on different GAN datasets.
• We show the method holds under both varying JPEG com-
pression factors and image patch sizes, accommodating a
range of real-world use cases.
2 RELATEDWORK
Since the seminal work on GANs [24], there have been several hun-
dreds of papers on using GANs to generate images. These works
focus on generating images of high perceptual quality [5, 25, 33,
36, 59, 67, 70], image-to-image translations [33, 85, 91], domain
transfer [40, 76], super-resolution [43], image synthesis and com-
pletion [32, 46, 83], and generation of facial attributes and expres-
sions [14, 40, 48, 65]. Several methods have been proposed in the
area of image forensics over the past years [9, 21, 47, 53, 80]. Recent
approaches have focused on applying deep learning based methods
to detect tampered images [6–8, 11, 17, 69, 90].
In digital image forensics, detection of GAN generated images
has been an active topic in recent times and several papers have
been published in the last few years [4, 10, 10, 13, 20, 22, 26, 29,
30, 34, 35, 39, 44, 45, 55–58, 60, 61, 63, 77, 79, 81, 82, 86–88, 92].
Other similar research include detection of computer generated
(CG) images [19, 52, 68, 84]
In [55], Marra et al. compare various methods to identify Cycle-
GAN images from normal ones. The top results they obtained are
using a combination of residual features [16, 17] and deep learn-
ing [15]. In [45], Li et al. compute the residuals of high pass filtered
images and then extract co-occurrence matrices on these residuals,
which are then concatenated to form a feature vector that can dis-
tinguish real from fake GAN images. In [88], Zhang et al. identify
an artifact caused by the up-sampling component included in the
common GAN pipeline and show that such artifacts are manifested
as replications of spectra in the frequency domain and thus propose
a classifier model based on the spectrum input, rather than the pixel
input.
We had previously proposed a 3 channel co-occurrence matrix
based method [61], and many other papers have shown the efficacy
of this method in their experimental evaluations [31, 50, 54, 62, 63,
78, 87]. However, in this paper we compute co-occurrence matrices
on horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions, as well as compute
them on image patches, thus facilitating detection, attribution and
localization of GAN generated images.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Co-Occurrence Matrix Computation
The co-occurrence matrices represent a two-dimensional histogram
of pixel pair values in a region of interest. The vertical axis of the
histogram represents the first value of the pair, and the horizon-
tal axis, the second value. Equation 1 shows an example of this
computation for a vertical pair.
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Figure 2: An example co-occurrence computation. The
input image (a) is split into its three color channels (b). For
each color channel, 4 different pairs of pixels are used to
generate 2-dimensional histograms (c). Horizontal, vertical,
diagonal, and anti-diagonal pairs are considered. These
histograms are then stacked to produce a single tensor (d).
For some tests, only a subset of the co-occurrence matrices
will be used.
Ci, j =
∑
m,n
{
1, I [m,n] = i and I [m + 1,n] = j
0, otherwise
(1)
Under the assumption of 8-bit pixel depth, this will always pro-
duce a co-occurrence matrix of size 256x256. This is a key advantage
of such a method, as it will allow for the same network to be trained
and tested on a variety of images without resizing.
Which pairs of pixels to take was one parameter of interest in our
tests. For any pixel not touching an edge, there are 8 possible neigh-
bors. We consider only 4 of these for our tests; right, bottom right,
bottom, and bottom left. The other 4 possible pairs will provide
redundant information. For example, the left pairs are equivalent
to swapping the order of the first and second pixel in the right pair.
In the co-occurrence matrix, this corresponds to a simple transpose.
There are many subsets of these 4 pairs which could be taken, but
our tests consider only a few; horizontal, vertical, horizontal and
vertical, or all.
Before passing thesematrices through a CNN, some pre-processing
is done. First, each co-occurrence matrix is divided by its maximum
value. Given that the input images may be of varying sizes, this
will force all inputs into a consistent scale. After normalization, all
co-occurrence matrices for an image are stacked in the depth di-
mension. In the example of an RGB image with all 4 co-occurrence
pairs, this will produce a new image-like feature tensor of size
256x256x12. Figure 2 gives a visualization of this process.
3.2 Convolutional Neural Networks
While the co-occurrence matrices are not themselves images, treat-
ing them as so has some theoretical backing. One of the primary
motivations for using CNNs in image processing is their translation
invariance property. In the case of a co-occurrence matrix, a trans-
lation along the main diagonal corresponds to adding a constant
Figure 3: The original Xception network [15], shown next
to our two modified models. Our architectures for detection
and attribution are the same, except for the last layer and
activation.
value to the image. We would not expect this manipulation to affect
the forensic properties.
In this paper, we use Xception Net [15] deep neural network
architecture for detection, attribution and localization of GAN gen-
erated images. The Xception network is a modified version of In-
ception network [74] but was created under a stronger theoretical
assumption than the original Inception, where cross-channel corre-
lations are completely split from spatial correlations by use depth-
wise separable convolutions. The network also includes residual
connections, as shown in Figure 3. For these reasons, the authors
claim that Xception can more easily find a better convergence point
than most other CNN architectures, while keeping model capacity
low [15]. In this paper, we modify the original input and output
shapes in the Xception network to accommodate our task as shown
in Figure 3. The initial convolutional portions of the network re-
main unchanged, though the output sizes of each block are slightly
different. This small change in size is accommodated by the global
pooling step. Finally, the last fully connected layer of each network
is changed to the desired number of output classes, and given the
appropriate activation. For detection and attribution, our archi-
tectures are the same except for the last layer and activation. For
localization, no changes were made to the model architecture but
co-occurrence matrices were extracted on small image patches, and
individually passed through the network.
4 DATASETS
We evaluated our method on five different GAN architectures, of
which each was trained on several different image generation tasks:
ProGAN [36], StarGAN [14], CycleGAN [91], StyleGAN [37], and
SPADE/GauGAN [64]. The modifications included image-to-image
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translation, facial attribute modification, style transfer, and pixel-
wise semantic label to image generation. A summary of the datasets,
including the number of images from each class, is shown in Fig-
ure 5. These comprise a total of more than 2.76 million images of
which 1.69 million images are real images and 1.07 million images
are fake GAN generated images. In several cases, one or more im-
ages in the GAN generated category will be directly associated with
an image in the authentic class. For example, a person’s headshot
untampered, blond, aged, and gender reversed will all be in the
dataset. However, the splitting for training accounts for this, and
will keep all of these images together to be put into either training,
validation, or test. Some sample images from all the GAN datasets
are shown in Figure 4.
4.0.1 StarGAN. This dataset consists of only celebrity photographs
from the CelebA dataset [49], and their GAN generated counter-
parts [14]. The GAN changes attributes of the person to give them
black hair, brown hair, blond hair, different gender, different age,
different hair and gender, different hair and age, different gender
and age, or different hair, age, and gender. These are the smallest
of all of the training images, being a square of size 128 pixels.
4.0.2 CycleGAN. This datasets includes image-to-image transla-
tions between awide array of image classes [91]. The sets horse2zebra,
apple2orange, and summer2winter do a strict image-to-image trans-
lation, with the assumption that the GAN will learn the areas to
modify. While the whole output is generated by the GAN, the
changes for these will ideally be more localized. Ukiyoe, Vangogh,
Cezanne, and Monet are four artists which the GAN attempts to
learn a translation from photographs to their respective styles of
painting. Facades and cityscapes represent the reverse of the image
segmentation task. Given a segmentation map as input, they pro-
duce an image of a facade or cityscape. Map2sat takes in a Google
Maps image containing road, building, and water outlines, and
generates a hypothetical satellite image.
4.0.3 ProGAN. This dataset consists of images of celebrities, and
their GAN generated counterparts, at a square size of 1024 pix-
els [36]. All data was obtained per the instructions provided in the
paper’s Github repository.
4.0.4 SPADE/GauGAN. SPADE/GauGAN contains realistic natural
images generated using GANs [64]. This dataset uses images from
ADE20k [89] dataset containing natural scenes andCOCO-Stuff [12]
dataset comprising day-to-day images of things and other stuff,
along with their associated segmentation maps. These untampered
images are considered as real images in the GAN framework, and
the pretrained models provided by the SPADE/GauGAN authors
are used to generate GAN images from the segmentation maps.
4.0.5 StyleGAN. This dataset contains realistic images of persons,
cars, cats and indoor scenes [37]. Images for this dataset were
provided by the authors.
Table 1: Comparison of different popular ImageNet [18]
classification architectures on classifying GANs from co-
occurrencematrices. All datasets aremixed for training, val-
idation, and testing. The features are extracted from awhole
image, with no JPEG compression.
Network Accuracy
VGG16 [71] 0.6115
ResNet50 [27] 0.9677
ResNet101 [27] 0.9755
ResNet152V2 [28] 0.9795
ResNet50V2 [28] 0.9856
InceptionResNetV2 [74] 0.9885
InceptionV3 [75] 0.9894
ResNet101V2 [28] 0.9900
Xception [15] 0.9916
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Training Procedure
All deep learning experiments in this paper were done using Keras
2.2.5 and all training was done using an Adam optimizer [41], learn-
ing rate of 10−4, and cross-entropy loss. A batch size of 64 was used
for all experiments. Unless otherwise stated, a split of 90% train-
ing, 5% validation, and 5% test was used. Given the large amount
of data available, a single iteration through the entire dataset for
training took 10 hours on a single Titan RTX GPU. To allow for
more frequent evaluation on the validation set, the length of an
epoch was capped at 100 batches. Validation steps were also capped
at 50 batches, and test sets at 2000 batches. After training for a suf-
ficient period of time for the network to converge, the checkpoint
which scored the highest in validation was chosen for testing. For
experiments to determine hyper-parameters, training was capped
at 50 epochs, and took approximately 3 hours each on a single Titan
RTX. After determination of hyper-parameters, training of the final
model was done for 200 epochs, taking approximately 12 hours.
5.2 Comparison with other CNN architectures:
First we evaluate our method on different well known CNN archi-
tectures: VGG16 [71], ResNet50 and ResNet101 [27],ResNet50V2,
ResNet101V2 and ResNet152V2 [28], InceptionV3 and Inception-
ResNetV2 [74], and Xception [15]. Shown in Table 1 are the results
for the different CNN networks. Though designed for ImageNet
classification, all models take in an image with height, width, and 3
channels, and output a one-hot encoded label. The models are used
as-is, with the following slight modifications. First, the number of
input channels is set to be the depth of the co-occurrence feature
tensor. Second, input shape was fixed at 256x256. Third, the number
of output channels was set to 1. All of these parameters were passed
as arguments to the respective Keras call for each model. A small
margin separated the top performers, though Xception was the
best with an accuracy of 0.9916 and had fewer parameters than
others. For this reason, we chose Xception for the remainder of the
experiments.
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(a) Real Images (b) GAN Images
Figure 4: Sample images from different GAN datasets (a) Real images and (b) GAN images from different GAN datasets (top to
bottom): ProGAN [36], StarGAN [14], CycleGAN [91], StyleGAN [37], and SPADE/GauGAN [64].
Figure 5: Quantitative summary of the GAN datasets used in
our experiments.
5.3 Comparison of Co-occurrence Matrix Pairs
Next we perform tests with different co-occurrence pairs, shown in
Table 2. These experiments included JPEG compression, randomly
selected from quality factors of 75, 85, 90, and no compression.
Interestingly, it seems that the addition of more co-occurrence pairs
did not significantly improve performance. For the remainder of
the test, all 4 co-occurrence pairs were used.
5.4 Effect of patch size
For applications, the two parameters of interest were JPEG com-
pression and patch size. The results for different patch sizes are
Table 2: Test on difference co-occurrence pairs. These were
done on the whole image, with the additional challenge of
JPEG compression. The JPEG quality factor was randomly
selected with equal probability from the set of 75, 85, 90, or
no JPEG compression
Pairs Accuracy
Horizontal 95.51
Vertical 95.56
Hor and Ver 95.17
Hor, Ver, and Diag 95.68
Table 3: Accuracy when trained on one patch size, and tested
on another. Data for training and testing has been pre-
processed using JPEG compression with quality factors ran-
domly selected from 75, 85, 90 or none.
Train
64 128 256
Test
64 0.7814 0.7555 0.6778
128 0.8273 0.8336 0.8158
256 0.8311 0.8546 0.8922
shown in Table 3. These results are from images JPEG compressed
by a factor randomly selected from 75, 85, 90, and none. A model is
trained for each of the possible patch sizes, and then each model
is tested against features from each patch size. It should be noted
that in cases where the input image is smaller than the requested
patch size, the whole image is used. There is notable generaliza-
tion between different patch sizes, in that the model trained on a
patch size of 256 and tested on 128 achieves an accuracy within a
few percentage points of a model trained and tested on 128. Thus
we would expect our models to work with a variety of untested
patch sizes within a reasonable range while only taking a minor
performance drop.
5.5 Effect of JPEG compression
Now assuming a fixed patch size of 128, we varied the JPEG quality
factors: 75,85,90 and no compression. The model was again trained
only on one particular JPEG factor as shown in Table 4. As expected,
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Table 4: Test accuracy when model is trained on images pre-
processed with one JPEG quality factor, and tested on an-
other.
Train
75 85 90 None
Test
75 0.7738 0.7448 0.7101 0.6605
85 0.8209 0.8593 0.8362 0.7209
90 0.8310 0.8690 0.8756 0.7651
None 0.9198 0.9386 0.9416 0.9702
Table 5: Train on all but one GAN, test on the held out im-
ages. Patch size of 128, no JPEG compression.
Test GAN Accuracy
StarGAN 0.8490
CycleGAN 0.7411
ProGAN 0.6768
SPADE 0.9874
StyleGAN 0.8265
we see that performance increases with respect to quality factor.
However, this table also shows that the model does not overfit to
a particular quality factor, in that testing on a slightly better or
worse quality factor gives a score not far from a model tuned to the
particular test quality factor.
5.6 Generalization
To test the generalization between GANs, leave-one-out cross vali-
dation was used for each GAN architecture. One dataset of GAN
images is used for testing and remaining GAN image datasets are
used for training. Here, a patch size of 128 was used with no JPEG
compression. From Table 5, we see that some GAN datasets such
as SPADE, StarGAN and StyleGAN have high accuracy and are
more generalizable. However, the accuracies for CycleGAN and
ProGAN are lower in comparison, thus suggesting that images
from these GAN categories should not be discarded when building
a bigger GAN detection framework. We also considered computing
co-occurrence matrices on the whole image and then repeated the
above experiment, but the overall accuracy did not improve.
Visualization using t-SNE: To further investigate the variability in
the GAN detection accuracies under the leave-one-out setting, we
use t-SNE visualization [51] from outputs of the penultimate layer of
the CNN, using images from the test set (as shown in Figure 6). The
t-SNE algorithm aims to reduce dimensionality of a set of vectors
while preserving relative distances as closely as possible.With an L2
distance function and linear transformation, this can be efficiently
found by PCA. While there are many solutions to this problem for
different distance metrics and optimization methods, KL divergence
on the Student-t distribution used in t-SNE has shown the most
promising results on real-world data [51].
To limit computation time, no more than 1000 images were used
for a particular GAN from either the authentic or GAN classes. As
recommended in the original t-SNE publication, the vector was first
reduced using Principle Component Analysis (PCA). The original
Figure 6: Visualization of images from different GAN
datasets using t-SNE [51].
2048 were reduced to 50 using PCA, and passed to the t-SNE algo-
rithm. As we see in Figure 6, the images in CycleGAN and ProGAN
are more tightly clustered, thus making them difficult to distinguish
between real and GAN generated images, while the images from
StarGAN, SPADE and StyleGAN are more separable, thus resulting
in higher accuracies in the leave-one-out experiment.
5.7 Comparison with State-of-the-art
We compare our proposed approach with various state-of-the-art
methods [55, 61, 88] on the CycleGAN dataset. In [55], Marra et al.
proposed the leave-one-category-out benchmark test to see how
well their methods work when one category from the CycleGAN
dataset is kept for testing and remaining are kept for training. The
methods they evaluated are based on steganalysis, generic image
manipulations, detection of computer graphics, a GAN discrim-
inator used in the CycleGAN paper, and generic deep learning
architecture pretrained on ImageNet [18], but fine tuned to the
CycleGAN dataset. Among these the top preforming ones were
from steganalysis [16, 23] based on extracting features from high-
pass residual images, a deep neural network designed to extract
residual features [17] (Cozzolino2017) and XceptionNet [15] deep
neural network trained on ImageNet but fine-tuned to this dataset.
Apart from Marra et al. [55], we also compare our method with
approaches including Nataraj et al. (Nataraj2019) [61], which uses
co-occurrence matrices computed in the horizontal direction, and
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Table 6: Comparison with State-of-the-art.
Method ap2or ho2zeb wint2sum citysc. facades map2sat Ukiyoe Van Gogh Cezanne Monet Average
Steganalysis feat. 0.9893 0.9844 0.6623 1.0000 0.9738 0.8809 0.9793 0.9973 0.9983 0.9852 0.9440
Cozzalino2017 0.9990 0.9998 0.6122 0.9992 0.9725 0.9959 1.0000 0.9993 1.0000 0.9916 0.9507
XceptionNet 0.9591 0.9916 0.7674 1.0000 0.9856 0.7679 1.0000 0.9993 1.0000 0.9510 0.9449
Nataraj2019 0.9978 0.9975 0.9972 0.9200 0.8063 0.9751 0.9963 1.0000 0.9963 0.9916 0.9784
Zhang2019 0.9830 0.9840 0.9990 1.0000 1.0000 0.7860 0.9990 0.9750 0.9920 0.9970 0.9720
Proposed approach 0.9982 0.9979 0.9982 0.9366 0.9498 0.9776 0.9973 0.9980 0.9993 0.9697 0.9817
Table 7: Number of images per class
Train Val Test
Authentic 1,612,202 42,382 42,397
StarGAN 28,062 738 711
CycleGAN 17,265 439 439
ProGAN 70,286 1833 1,881
SPADE 138,075 3,717 3,704
StyleGAN 766,045 20,220 20,158
Zhang et al.(Zhang2019) [88], which uses spectra of up-sampling
artifacts used in the GAN generating procedure to classify GAN
images.
Table 6 summarizes the results of our proposed approach against
other state-of-the-art approaches. Our method obtained the best
average accuracy of 0.9817, when compared with other methods.
Even on individual categories, our method obtained more than 0.90
on all categories.
5.8 Tackling newer challenges like StyleGAN2
Apart from generalization, we tested our method on 100,000 images
from the recently released StyleGAN2 [38] dataset of celebrity faces.
The quality of these images were much better than the previous ver-
sion and appeared realistic. When we tested on this dataset without
any fine-tuning, we obtained an accuracy of 0.9464. This shows that
our approach is promising in adapting to newer challenges. We also
fine-tuned to this dataset by adding 100,000 authentic images ran-
domly chosen from different GAN datasets, thus our new dataset
comprised of 100,000 authentic images and 100,000 StyleGAN2
images. Then, we split this data into 40% training, 10% validation
and 50% testing. When we trained a new network on this dataset,
we obtained a validation accuracy of 0.9984 and testing accuracy
of 0.9972, thus also confirming that our approach can be made
adjustable to newer GAN datasets.
5.9 GAN Attribution/Classification
While the primary area of interest is in determining the authen-
ticity of an image, an immediate extension would be to determine
which GAN was used. Here we perform an additional experiment
on GAN class classification/attribution as a 6-class classification
problem, the classes being: Real, StarGAN, CycleGAN, ProGAN,
SPADE/GauGAN and StyleGAN. The number of output layers in
the CNN was changed from 1 to 6, and output with the largest
value was selected as the estimate. A breakdown of the number of
images per class for training, validation and testing is given in Ta-
ble 7. First, the network was trained where the input co-occurrence
matrices were computed on the whole image. The training proce-
dure was kept the same as with all other tests in the paper, with
the exception of using a batch size of 60, and 10 images from each
class per batch. This encouraged the network to not develop a bias
towards any particular GAN for which we have more training data.
First we consider the images as they are provided in the datasets.
The classification results are shown in the form of confusion ma-
trices in Table 8. For convenience, we also report the equal prior
accuracy, equal to the average along the diagonal of the confusion
matrix. This equal prior accuracy can be interpreted as the classifi-
cation accuracy if each class is equally likely. We obtain an overall
classification accuracy (considering equal priors) of 0.9654. High
classification accuracy was obtained for most categories. StyleGAN
had comparatively lower accuracy but still more than 90%, being
mostly confused with SPADE/GauGAN and CycleGAN. These re-
sults show that our approach can also be used to identify which
category of GAN was used.
Next, we trained the network using a patch size of 128×128 as
input, and repeated the experiment. This is to see how well our
method can be used for detection, localization as well as classifi-
cation. The classification results are shown in Table 9. Now, we
obtain an overall classification accuracy (considering equal priors)
of 0.8477 (a drop of 12% when compared to full image accuracy).
High classification accuracy was obtained for StarGAN, CycleGAN
and ProGAN, while SPADE/GauGAN and StyleGAN had compara-
tively lower accuracies. These could be due to many factors such as
the number of test images per class, patch size, and the authentic
image datasets that were used for training in generating these GAN
images. In Table 10 we repeat the same experiment (with patch
size 128×128) but with images that were randomly preprocessed
with JPEG quality factors of 75, 85, 90, or no JPEG compression,
with each of the four preprocessing methods equally likely. For
this experiment, the overall classification accuracy drops slightly
to 0.8088 due to the impact of JPEG compression.
For the multi-class experiment trained without JPEG compres-
sion, we repeat the t-SNE visualization procedure. Figure 7 shows
all data-points on a single plot. These visualizations further support
the results from the classification experiment.
5.10 Localization
Figure 8 show two example localization outputs. The image is pro-
cessed in overlapping patches, with a particular stride and patch
size. A co-occurrence matrix is then extracted for each patch, and
passed through the CNN to produce a score. For pixels which are a
part of multiple patches, the scores are simply the mean of all of the
patch responses. These two examples use a patch size of 128, and a
stride of 8. We can see that the heatmaps are predominantly blue
for real images and predominantly red for GAN generated images.
This further supports that our method can be effectively used for
GAN localization.
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Table 8: Confusion matrix on images from GAN datasets without any pre-processing on the full image. Equal prior accuracy
of 0.9654.
Predicted Label
Real StarGAN CycleGAN ProGAN SPADE StyleGAN
GT Label
Real 0.975 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.002 0.006
StarGAN 0.000 0.976 0.014 0.000 0.010 0.000
CycleGAN 0.000 0.000 0.964 0.000 0.036 0.000
ProGAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
SPADE 0.001 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.975 0.005
StyleGAN 0.007 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.068 0.902
Table 9: Confusionmatrix on images fromGAN datasets without any pre-processing on 128×128 patches. Equal prior accuracy
of 0.8477.
Predicted Label
Real StarGAN CycleGAN ProGAN SPADE StyleGAN
GT Label
Real 0.826 0.003 0.016 0.021 0.066 0.068
StarGAN 0.000 0.933 0.054 0.000 0.006 0.006
CycleGAN 0.000 0.002 0.959 0.002 0.032 0.005
ProGAN 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.981 0.004 0.005
SPADE 0.001 0.025 0.210 0.008 0.728 0.029
StyleGAN 0.003 0.025 0.101 0.009 0.203 0.659
Table 10: Confusionmatrix with JPEG compression (128×128 patches). Equal prior accuracy of 0.8088. The images were prepro-
cessed using a JPEG factor of 75, 85, 90, or no compression. Each of these four possible preprocessing functions was randomly
selected with equal probability for every image.
Predicted Label
Real StarGAN CycleGAN ProGAN SPADE StyleGAN
GT Label
Real 0.741 0.005 0.020 0.026 0.103 0.104
StarGAN 0.006 0.927 0.023 0.000 0.031 0.012
CycleGAN 0.009 0.014 0.892 0.007 0.074 0.005
ProGAN 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.973 0.007 0.007
SPADE 0.075 0.015 0.095 0.009 0.765 0.042
StyleGAN 0.114 0.021 0.059 0.008 0.243 0.555
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel method to detect and attribute
GAN generated images, and localize the area of manipulations. De-
tailed experimental results using a collection of over 2.7 million
GAN and authentic images encompassing 5 major GAN datasets
demonstrate that the proposed model is highly effective on a range
of image scales and JPEG compression factors. In addition, the t-SNE
visualization with the neural network deep features showed promis-
ing separation of GAN and authentic images using our method.
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